Israel, Palestine, and the European Union's new "power language"-is there any change?

Progress in resolving the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is extremely important to the European Union. Its long-term and conceited commitment to a two-state solution – an independent, democratic, viable and continuous Palestinian state coexisting with Israel and other neighboring countries in peace and security [1] – is the key to the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) ) And backed by a large amount of funds in various forms. However, so far, the EU’s performance in achieving its goals has been widely regarded as a paralyzing failure. The European Union is often criticized in public and academic discussions for its weak actions, hesitation, and lack of autonomy [2]. In addition, these criticisms have been published not only in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also in all attempts by the European Union to advocate its CFSP.

In 2019, following the rotation of the European Commission, the new EU High Representative appointed Josep Borrell (HR/VP) of the Alliance for Foreign and Security Policy (HR/VP), who recognized this weak behavior, And try to solve it by at least linguistically turning to neo-realism. In a speech to the European Parliament on October 10, 2019 he called for "building a stronger EU in a world of power politics" [3]where the EU needs to "learn the language of power" [4]. Therefore, the focus of this research should be to answer two questions:

RQ.1 How can we evaluate the prospects for the success of Borrell's fundamental transformation into a "power language"?

] RQ.2 What is his outlook in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

The second chapter focuses on answering RQ.1 and solving this problem through the use of critical discourse analysis (CDA). Theoretical viewpoints and methods related to the process of change. [5] The premise of CDA is to understand a kind of discourse transformation, we must study its relationship with other social discourses and practices [6] (the fuzzy interaction of social forces that shape our behavior [7]) help me build A framework to reach RQ.1. – We can evaluate the prospect of success by measuring the trajectory of the discourse and social practice of competition in the CFSP field. The framework was then used to answer the questions of RQ.2 and implemented into the following three sub-questions:

SQ.1: Representative discourse and society in the EU’s paralysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict What is practice? past?

SQ.2: How have these practices changed over time?

SQ.3: What does it mean to Borrell's ambition to pursue a "stronger EU"? [8]

Chapter 3 focuses on answering SQ.1, first by identifying the previous strategic discourse of HR(/VP) (the subject of the study; this will become Borrell’s power narrative language) Called "recursive practice" ' (1). Then, through elite interviews, after EU diplomats decided to boycott Hamas, they questioned their social practices because Hamas succeeded in the 2006 Palestinian election to expose the other three competing social practices . That is: the pressure of the audience (2); internal incoherence (3); and the natural obedience of public officials (4). This chapter points out that practice (1) is weakened by common practices (2), (3) and (4).

Chapter 4 then answers SQ.2 by measuring changes in practices identified in Chapter 3 during the EU’s response. The reason why the US Embassy moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2017/18. Similarly, the evidence for inspection comes from a combination of elite interviews and EU documents. This chapter finds the transformation of HR/VP strategic discourse-in line with Borrell’s demand for a "stronger EU", but at the same time, has increased the pressure on the audience (2), Internal discontinuity (3) increases, while the natural obedience of civil servants (4) has consistency .

Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of Chapter 3. And fourth, and put them in the CDA framework established in Chapter 2, so as to answer SQ.3 and the overall RQ.2. Chapter 5 concludes that in order for Borrell’s power narrative language to successfully resolve the EU’s weak actions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the relative strength of social practices (2), (3) and (4) must also be reduced. Since this study did not observe this reduction, but instead has seen growth/proliferation in competitive practices (2), (3) and (4), it can be said that Borrell’s prospects are very low.

When working on this paper, I hope to understand the importance of diplomatic social practice in the process of EU foreign policy, because it has been ignored. [9] This is also to explain why the EU unknowingly consolidated Israel's occupation of Palestine, and in doing so, provided a solution to the EU's weak actions on the conflict. Therefore, Chapter 5 also discusses the significance of this research, and the conclusions suggest recommendations related to these broader research goals.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework [19659002] Introduction

My research is to obtain information and structure from the theoretical framework-Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA is also a conceptual tool for my plea to analyze and criticize my evidence base. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to introduce readers to CDA and its use in EU foreign policy analysis, and to put my research within the CDA framework to achieve RQ.1. To this end, I first outlined the main claims of the constructivist theory (that is, CDA belongs to this theory), and then used CDA to further promote the constructivist concept of constitutive relations. Subsequently, I included CDA in the EU foreign policy research. Then, I projected this analytical concept into the reality of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in order to create a framework for my research and at the same time justify my use of CDA in this project. Throughout the process, I demonstrated the relationship between CDA and the rationalist approach to international relations (IR) and demonstrated the advantages of the CDA approach. By placing my project in the CDA framework, this chapter should reasonably clarify how I will answer RQ.2.

What is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)?

CDA is a larger organization. Constructivism. Constructivism in IR focuses on identities, interests and interactions and how to construct them through collective meaning. [10] Constructivism believes that inter-subject knowledge and thought have a constitutive influence on social reality and its evolution. The meaning between subjects has structural attributes. These structural attributes can not only restrict or empower participants, but also define their social reality. The basis of this theory is the understanding that the material world is not classified, and our knowledge objects are not independent of our interpretation and language. This is because human beings are social people and cannot be separated from the context of normative meaning. "Building something is an act, and it will become a subject or object that does not exist." [11] The EU's CFSP is one of the subjects. Another Palestinian Authority government dominated by "terrorism." ‘Once constructed, each of these objects has a specific meaning and purpose in the context. In terms of their shape and form, they have social values, norms and assumptions, rather than pure personal thoughts or meaning products, so they are social constructions. '[12] Constructivist scholar Alexander Winter conducted further research on this. In his seminal work Constructing International Politics [13]he explained that only objects (X) are possible, and the social structure (Y) without them would not exist. This constitutive relationship establishes a necessary or logical connection between object and structure. [14] I will study this constitutive relationship in my research. I intend to analyze the dialectical relationship between HR/VP's strategic discourse (X)-his views or strategies on European foreign policy-and the social structure around it. In this case, this is the theme of the policy-making field Israel- Palestine conflict (Y).

CDA scholars, such as Norman Fairclough, Laclau, and Mouffe, added criticism and research focus to Winter's theory of constitutive relations. Fairclough’s CDA particularly advocates that discourse is a form of social practice, not only constitutes the social world, and constitutes other social practices. As a social practice, discourse not only helps (re)shapes social structures, but also reflects them. [15] Political and policy structures, such as the European Union’s CFSP, are generated through the daily social behavior of individuals. Therefore, identity and interest are internal to the interaction (rather than the logic of rationalism is external). [16] Therefore, if you want to switch the structure, you must change the practice. [17] Therefore, if I want to assess the prospects of structural change, I need to analyze the social and discursive practices that constitute structural change. [18]

It is necessary to conceptualize the interaction between different discourses competing in the same field to clarify the ambiguity of their practice in a specific field, and how to make efforts to stabilize and maintain the specific field Dominant meaning. The relationship between structure and practice. As I will demonstrate now, this can be provided by the CDA. The dominant meaning is maintained through the order of discourse. [19] This refers to the way in which competing discourses in the same field are connected by the network. The entire network is the sequence of discourse, which constitutes a social structure. The order of discourse becomes the mainstream, and maintains the dominant identity, meaning, behavior and coping style. [20] For example, there is a major way to hold diplomatic meetings between EU and Hamas officials (in secret, and the EU proposes a predetermined policy that prevents equal dialogue [21]). This is because these two actors (legal embassies vs. illegal terrorists) have dominant identities, which will affect and limit their interaction. This produced a major response method (securitisation [23]) that can be used to replicate and consolidate those same major logos and practices. All these social practices together constitute the social structure defined by the EU CFSP . Charette believes that the reappearance of this social structure through the repeated practices of EU diplomats is a characteristic of the EU’s weak CFSP actions against Israel and Palestine. [24] The "critical" aspect of CDA criticizes the social systems and practices that generate discourse. This may lead to the discovery of deeper social structures and mechanisms, and to question the role of institutions and practices. [25] The traditional constructivists pay attention to the question of why ; the critical constructivists pay attention to the question of . Since RQ.1 is – How do we assess the prospects for the success of Borrell’s power language? -Critical analysis seems to be the best way to answer this question.

CDA in EU foreign policy research

This led me to place CDA and constructivism in EU foreign policy research. It is now commonplace to study the EU as an international actor, but it is still important to establish links between the integration and decision-making processes within the EU and external developments on the international stage. [26] Hill et al. Pay attention to the three views about IR and EU: the EU is a subsystem of IR; the EU is the process of IR; and the EU is a major country in IR. [27] This research is looking inward, so I understand the EU as a subsystem of IR, because under this view there is neo-institutionalism or sociological institutionalism, which encourages us to study the EU through the EU's system. It believes that internal socialization can produce more actions over time, and the key to this area is the way member states express, interact and discuss internally. [28] CDA and constructivism complement this new institutionalist approach to EU research.

The main constructivists writing on the EU CFSP include Ian Manners, M.E. Smith and Pierson. [29] They are different from the traditional EU foreign policy analysis methods (rationalism (such as neorealism and neoliberal theories)). Rationalists view the EU CFSP in the Middle East as mere declarative diplomacy-just "words of justice". [30] Constructivists believe that using CDA methods, we can analyze some aspects of CFSP, which rationalists cannot see: it is social structure/reality, not just the result of policy. It is crucial that constructivist scholars understand the EU's foreign policy as a "negotiation order" [31]so this should be analyzed. Constructivists believe that the discourse and practice of negotiating and forming social structures, such as Borrell’s speech at a congressional hearing, has an important independent status. [32] Habermas’ "Communicative Action" theory explains why this is especially true for CFSP. It believes that discourse practice has the following abilities:

(i) Turn zero-sum into a mixed motivation game, and build common sense necessary to reach cooperative arrangements without hegemonic enforcers; [33]

Many people believe that CFSP The definition of is: the basic sequence of formal and informal rules; and (ii) the establishment of new international norms to socialize actors into existing codes of conduct. Regulate a series of expanding treaty provisions; expanding the scope of policy areas; replicated policy practices; higher aspirations; etc. [34] At the same time, CFSP is characterized by unavoidable inaction, lack of consensus, and no impact on external participants, events and development. [35] Rationalists look at the latter and draw conclusions about the former, and CDA encourages us to analyze the former in order to understand the latter-this will be my approach.

Applying CDA to my research project

has proposed a special way to conceptualize discourse and discourse sequence, in order to use them for empirical analysis purposes. I set out to project this analysis The Israeli-Palestinian case transformed the CFSP's concept of reality into reality to create a research framework and provide answers to RQ.1. The starting point of my research is to define a dramatic shift in CFSP's discourse practice-the strategic discourse of HR/VP. Since CDA pays special attention to the fundamental changes in social life and how semioticism adapts to this process of change, CDA is very relevant to the project. The focus of CDA is the transformation of the relationship between discourse and other social practices. [36] This provides the direction and framework for my research:

  • I am seeking to understand: How do we evaluate the prospects of success in in discourse in discourse ? Power"
  • The CDA theory shows that: (a) "success" will be a change in the social structure of CFSP (in this case, it is the effect of solving the weak behavior of the EU); and (b) the "discourse" of HR/VP is A social practice based on the discourse of negotiation and other social practices. [37]
  • Therefore, in order to accurately assess the prospects of success, I must measure

This framework can now be used to answer RQ.2: What is the outlook for Borrell in this situation? The Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

There are two main reasons why I chose to focus the CFSP on resolving this conflict. First, in the 1960s and 70s, it was called " The "Arab-Israel conflict" is seen as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to unite the young foreign policy institutions of the European Community (EC), so it can be said to have played an important role in the development of Arab countries. Today's CFSP. [38] The deep and long-term EU Participation shows that it has deeply established dominant and competitive social practices, making it an ideal case study for CDA. At the same time, the EU’s performance in conflicts has always been considered a paralysing failure, thus preventing the EU from achieving its goals. The goal of the two-state solution [39]did not inadvertently enhance the dynamics of Israeli power over Palestine- "On the contrary, we fund the Israeli occupation. [40] Therefore, it is necessary to study this deadlock from a new perspective such as CDA and an underutilized perspective.

To the latter point, because rationalist scholars tend to study policy results, because CFSP (criticism) Sexual) discourse analysis has literature [41] at the policy process level. There is a clear gap in this regard because they have more palatable meanings. But as far as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is concerned, the rationalist’s research has failed to assess the EU’s Weak actions provide solutions. CDA can gain insight into the internal dynamics of EU foreign policy and clarify the social structure that rationalism cannot do. [42] In addition, CDA is actually useful in two aspects: from a theoretical perspective and methodologically. Said that [43] is very suitable for the empirical and explanatory aspects of this research. In addition, Norman Fairclough's CDA can be used in combination with other theoretical methods because it has social phenomena other than discourse phenomena. Experience. [44] This is ideal, because “the quest to explain and understand the EU’s international relations requires methodological diversity. [45] Finally, CDA is a critical form of social science and therefore has liberating goals. [46] This will help me achieve broader research goals, especially for the EU’s solution to the weak Israeli-Palestinian actions The plan creates space to benefit those who are negatively affected by the strong Israeli occupation of the European Union’s diplomatic diploma.

Chapter Three

Determine discourse and social practice

Introduction

Using the CDA framework, this chapter will focus on answering SQ.1 ( In the past, has the European Union characterized by dialogue and social practice been paralyzed?) I will first The identified social practice is the former High Representative (HR) [47] strategic discourse, the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) [48]and the equivalent freedom chain by Ian Manners [49] or CDA scholar ] Is conceptualized as a European normative force. [50] This is the only practice that is determined based on the language text, so I distinguish it as a "disturbing" practice. It is also the subject of this research. Then I will focus on determining the field of CFSP Fighting for space to reveal other social practices in the order of discourse . To this end, I used CDA to rigorously examine the interaction of EU policymakers after the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, which witnessed the Palestinian leadership led by Hamas The authority government won. The popular practice – this time is of a social nature – I am here to point out: Spectator pressure (2); internal incoherence (3); This chapter will show that discourse practice (1) There is no constitutive relationship with social exercises (2), (3) and (4). On the contrary, these social practices hinder the effectiveness of human resource strategic discourse and aggravate the characteristics of the EU’s weak behavior.

Confirmed discourse practice (1): “Ensure Europe’s security in a better world”

In 2003, the European Council approved HR’s CFSP report: “European Security Strategy: Better A Safe Europe in the World” (ESS). [51] This marks the first time that the European Union has considered its CFSP goals. [52] The famous call is to “establish an effective multilateral system for a fairer, safer and more unified world . [53] In realizing such a world, the "Environmental and Social Standards" boldly advocate the EU's normative capabilities. For example, regarding the establishment of strategic partnerships, the entire document mentions "common values" [54] seven times. These common Values ​​include "human rights, democracy and the rule of law, market economy principles, and a commitment to common interests and goals." [55]

This strategic discourse is conceptualized as "European Normative Power" (NPE). NPE is a conceptual framework , Mainly developed by constructivist scholar Ian Manners. [56] In short, the concept of NPE is that the EU can help influence what is considered "normal" and acceptable in IR by taking actions and examples. [57] He believes that the common concepts of EU member states on the role of the EU in the international community are bound together, and agree that the starting point of political practice is the "common values" on which the EU's external actions are based: peace, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. [58] Policy makers and the "Environmental and Social Standards" clearly expressed NPE in terms such as "European Policy" [59]which, compared with the militarist policy of the United States, advocates diplomacy, negotiation and compromise.[60] This strategic discourse is heavily influenced by the European Union’s liberal ideology, which is dedicated to “civilized international relations as part of the broader transformation of the international community. [61] Many of the CFSP’s practices related to conflict management in the 2000s adopted a liberal policy. An example: the European Union’s election observation missions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2006, [62] aimed at supporting free and fair elections in Palestine. Promote the values ​​of freedom, democracy and human rights in Europe.[63] It can be said that this policy is formed in a discourse in which the values ​​of freedom play a central role in conflict resolution.[64]

The expression of shared free values ​​in ESS can be explained by CDA scholars' Laclau and Mouffe (1985) theory. Part of the equivalence chain. [65] This is the link between concepts, and the differences between them disappear. There is a universal chain of freedom equivalents in the CFSP, in which human rights are related to the democratic system of freedom. Larsen claimed that in the 2000s, "there seems to be no other general discussion in EU documents that borrowed content from the equivalent freedom chain. "[66] defines the first discursive practice that forms part of the CFSP society.

Determined social practices (2), (3) and (4) [19659002] Here I will be critical To study the social and discourse behaviors of EU diplomats after the failure of the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006. This activity took place when the concepts of ESS and the “European Method” were established. This is also a case study in which the EU’s CFSP is considered Relatively weak [67] and full of "double standards." [68] The evidence I am studying comes from a combination of elite interviews conducted by myself and a series of existing series of elite interviews conducted by Catherine Charrett [69] and January 2006 European Union documents and press statements from January to June 2006.

In my analysis of the evidence, I mainly focused on the following to describe different social practices:

  • Particularly the way each discourse gives meaning;
  • Any understanding classified as common sense in all discourses. [70]

Context

The Palestinian Democratic Legislative Election in January 2006 elected the Palestinian Authority led by Hamas ( PA) The government won. The election itself was funded by the EU, supervised and considered by EU officials to be free and fair. [71] Nevertheless, after the election was successful, the EU (as a member of the Quartet [72]) subsequently suspended the All financial assistance from the Palestinian Authority. They said this is because the Palestinian Authority does not accept the Quartet’s principle of renunciation of violence and recognition of Israel’s right to subsistence.[73] Critics, including EU officials, said of the EU’s actions here, It was weak, failed to fulfill its shared liberal values, and subsequently made the following explanation: "(…) the whole situation is collapsing. Violence occurred and the credibility of the Palestinian Legislative Council was destroyed. [74]

Social Practice

I think there are three main social practices that define and constitute policy making in this situation.

2. Spectator pressure

EU Under pressure from the political elites of Israel and the United States, they ignored the outcome of democracy and instead supported the preferred Palestinian party Fatah. Turner called this position "peace-building through exclusion." The priority here is to support the support of the international community. Political elites, rather than supporting good governance reforms. [75] On the ground, this manifests itself in the form of pressure lobbying by Israel and the United States:

After the election, US officials can be seen immediately patrolling…. Americans are approaching the EU Officials put pressure on them to respond to Hamas’s success. Basically, the United States has been implementing the policy of Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman and pushing this policy to European officials. [76]

In addition to the actual presence of lobbyists In addition, it can be said that the European Union, especially as a member of the Quartet, is under pressure to perform to an international audience. The pattern illuminates:

Some member states convince themselves that if we take in Israel or Washington to be regarded as hostile or We will play our own role for the unhelpful stand. [77]

Indeed, many critics of the Quartet are ceremonial, but in fact they only extract the position of the United States. Persson's analysis of the 1967-2009 EC/EU statement further proves This is correct. [78] He observed that the EU’s transformation is less critical of Israel in all institutions at present. This is in sharp contrast to the EU’s past behavior [79]thus indicating the prevalence of a new kind of CFSP. Words: The EU should complement the United States. The CDA theory shows that reiterating this pressure at other key strategic moments will make it natural, so it becomes common sense with the United States. This ignores the election results and supports "good people" (Fatah) The social pressures of China have weakened the effectiveness of the strategic discourse of human resources by directly conflicting with democratic liberalism.

3. Internal Incoherence

Another assumed natural state is related to EU member states. Israel or Palestine fought side by side, which prevented a unified response and directly led to the EU’s “weak action” in this area. Patrick Child described the EU when dealing with issues related to Palestinian politics A special working culture among member states:

Basically, some member states are naturally inclined to stand in the debate Israel because of their historical relationship with the United States, or because of their history with Israel and the Jewish population. One side, while others out For different historical reasons, he has more loyalty and sympathy for the Palestinian cause. [81]

Among decision makers, well-known "facts" such as "[82] and Visegrad hopes to show loyalty as an ally of the United States, [83] limits their creativity in making decisions. At the same time:

The position of the British government is often skeptical of Israelis. At the same time, they will not shake the ship because the Americans wait. Although there is a lot of sympathy for the Palestinians, they have no political influence. [84]

Repeated use of this claim It is an arrogant fact that denies the possibility of treating them otherwise. At the same time, Davis’s comments show the constitutive relationship between this approach (3) and the pressure from the audience (2), because of the solidarity of member states It is to support the United States. This constitutes the picture of the discourse order . If the EU wants to get rid of internal disharmony and take effective collective action, it must first make these work cultures anomie.

4. Obedient Of civil servants

The final social practice I have observed is a submissive discourse towards civil servants and members of the European Parliament. Although they have professional knowledge, they cannot influence and change their social structure. Both Charrett and my own interviews show that EU officials' demonstrate a frustration between believing that the EU's sanction of Hamas was misplaced, and being part of a process that enacted it anyways.'[85] It was documented that some members of the Foreign Affairs Committee'warned that Hamas should not be pushed too hard and too fast, pointing out that Hamas itself was divided.'[86]

But ultimately those working in the Parliament “did not feel involved”.[87] Similarly, in the Commission:'There was lots of people who were very conscious of t he double standards being demonstrated here.'[88] A former colleague of HR Javier Solana offers his opinions on the possibility that Solana preferred an alternative response to Hamas's success:

Anti-Hamas policy, was not Solana's design. Totally not. He implemented it because he was an obedient civil servant, but it was not his idea. It is an example of one of those things that were decided elsewhere and imposed on him as an implementer of such decisions, I can bet on that.[19659075]A Rationalist explanation would offer that, formally, the Council of Ministers holds power of decision making on foreign policy and passes it on to be enacted by subordinate institutions. But a CDA lens pushes us to problematize how social pressure prevents alternative discourses from being aired . At an institutional level, bureaucrats, such as the HR, are pressured by fears of being politically marginalised or of losing their job to conform to the discourse of the day:'Any other decision [1 9459144] would have put his job at risk, and Solana would have never done this.'[91]

This practice of obedience forecloses engagement with alternative policy outcomes. It also weakens the role of HR and hence his Strategy Discourse (1 ) as a tool for change.

Conclusion

This chapter identified one discursive practice and three competing social practices that characterised CFSP towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2006. It is clear there was no constitutive relationship between the HR's Strategic Discourse (1) and social practices (2), (3) and (4). What's more, the relative strength of those social practices work to the detriment of discursive practice (1) and the EU's prospects as a strategic actor by keeping it subordinate to the US, disjointed and afraid to change the status quo on Israel-Palestine. In order for Borrell to succeed in overturning EU's weak actorness and embrace a “language of power”[92] therefore, the rel ative strength of competing practices (2) (3) and (4) would have to reduce. In the next chapter I measure if this has come to be the case.

CHAPTER FOUR

Measuring Change in Discursive & Social Practices

Introduction

Chapter Three put forward one discursive and three competing social practices that characterised CFSP towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2006 . This chapter shall be focused upon measuring for change over time to those same practices thereby answering SQ.2. I shall start by outlining the contemporary Strategy Discourse of the HR/VP depicted in the 2016 European Global Strategy and in a speech given by HR /VP, Josep Borrell, 2019. I then turn my attention to the competing three social practices and assess how they have changed in a contemporary setting – that being the EU's reaction to the US' decision to move its embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem in 2017 as well as the broader context. In measuring for change over time, this chapter finds:

  1. A transformation of the Strategic Discourse of the HR/VP – with aspirations for'a Stronger EU'.

Competing with:

  • an increased pressure from the audience;
  • an intensified internal incoherence;
  • a consistency in the naturalised obedience of civil servants

Measured Discursive Practice (1): From'A Secure Europe' to'A Stronger Europe '

In December 2013, HR/VP, Federica Mogherini, was tasked with drafting a European Global Strategy (EGS) to revaluate the EU's CFSP strategy, as the relevance of the 2003 ESS[93] strategic document was being questioned.[94] Published in 2016, the EGS[95] is substantially different from the 2003 ESS in numerous ways. For example, where ESS was bold on normative power, even hubristic, the EGS is modest, realistic and constructive[96] –'We will not strive to export our model, but rat her seek reciprocal inspiration from different regional experiences.'[97]'Strategic autonomy in regional involvement' is mentioned seven times throughout the document, which Howorth notes this is an echo of the message from Washington – that the EU must take over greater leadership in their own neighbourhood.[98] Most importantly, the EGS recognises that'In this fragile world, soft power is not enough' and that in order to be a credible actor EU must enhance its security and defence.[99] This is a move away from the liberal chain of equivalence (whereby human rights are affiliated to democracy to liberty and so forth) we observed in the ESS towards a more realist foreign policy. New appointee to HR/VP Josep Borrell takes this strategic discourse further by addressing popular criticisms from public and scholarly discussions that the EU is weak, lacks Member State convergence and autonomy. For example, he details that enhanced security and defence sh ould involve accruing military might and that developing European defence will enable the EU to better balance the NATO transatlantic relationship[100] so suggesting the EU play less of a subordinate role to the US. He calls for greater integration of Member State foreign policies with the Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS) and more coherence between internal and external policies, such as trade, as ‘we have the instruments to play power politics and we need to put them together.’[101]  Indeed, he asserts that, against the backdrop of a polycentric international system where principles of liberal democracy not necessarily shared, ‘the EU needs to learn the language of power.’[102] Some EU pundits have suggested Borrell is inciting neo-realist foreign policy principles.[103] What is clear is that his speech, coupled with the EGS, marks a dramatic shift away from the previous CFSP Strategic Discourse where ‘there did not seem to be other general dis courses in EU documents which draw on something different from a liberal chain of equivalence.’[104]  Since discourse is used in IR settings to ‘establish new international norms to socialise actors into existing ones,’[105] we can assume Borrell is trying to change the social structure to effect of solving EU weak actorness. But for him to be successful, his discourse must prevail over the forceful competing social practices.

Measured Social Practices (2), (3) and (4)

To measure for change to the competing social practices I will be critically examining the practices of EU diplomats in reaction to the US’ decision to move its embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem in 2017 and the broader context. I have chosen this event because firstly, it took place a year following the publication of the EGS, hence aspirations for a ‘stronger EU in the world’ had been set. Secondly, despite these aspirations, the EU failed to respond with a joint stateme nt denouncing the US’ move resulting in another instance of EU weak actorness and so parallels with 2006 can be drawn. Evidence I am examining come from elite interviews conducted by myself and by EU journalists as well as EU documents from the period December 2017 to June 2018. In particular I am looking for:

  • an increase, decrease or consistency in the prevalence of a social practice
  • diverging or deepened understandings naturalised in all of the discourses as common-sense.[106]

Context

On December 6, 2017, US President Donald Trump announced the United States recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and ordered the planning of the relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. His move overturned the international – and EU – consensus on the conflict which viewed the status of Jerusalem as something to be negotiated as part of a final status agreement.[107] The official opening of the US e mbassy in Jerusalem took place on May 14th 2018. On both occasions the EU struggled to give a strong coherent response as attempts to publish joint statements were blocked by Member States Hungary, Czech Republic and others.[108] Their veto’s left the remaining 25 EU countries to issue individual communiques, while reducing the EU reaction to a tweet by its mission in Tel Aviv.[109]

2. Pressure from the Audience

Chapter three defined this social practice as the EU being under pressure from Israeli and American political elites to toe the US’ line. Pressure was exerted directly, via the physical presence of lobbyists, and indirectly, through a pressure to perform to the international audience. CDA focused research reveals that direct pressure from the US and Israel on the EU has actually increased. When asked whether, in their experience, the presence of US and/or Israeli diplomats had increased, decreased or stayed the same, both interviewees stated it had increased in Brussels since 2006.[110] [111] By way of explanation former MEP Chris Davies said “Now they’re trying to win support for the Trump plan and basically just trying to make sure the EU is acquiescent.”[112]

A former MEP illuminated that meetings with Parliamentary Delegations for relations with Israel (D-IL) and with Palestine (DPAL) are conducted separately – with no presence from either counterpart – and this was a deliberate move by the Israeli lobby to ensure a technical barrier to having all parties around the table.[113] Indeed, many MEPs have relays with Israeli lobby groups and are gathered under the banner of the European Coalition for Israel (ECI).[114]Funding for the ECI increased by 100,000€ in 2016,[115] implying efforts to influence the Parliament were increased before and around the time of Trump’s embassy relocation.

However, unlike in 2006, the EU is under less pressure to be seen to agree with the US as unilateral moves by the Trump administration are perceived as counterproductive to cooperation by the international audience.[116] Yet the EU still failed to produce a coherent response in opposition to the US 2017-18. CDA directed research offers an explanation – a senior European diplomat told a Brussels based journalist:

The Hungarians didn’t want to poke Trump in the eye and the Czechs and the Romanians are considering to move their embassies to Jerusalem against the EU position. This is the state of the EU these days.[117]

Their comments echoes that of Pattern in 2006;[118] the same Member States still feel pressure to be seen supporting the US. Like in 2006, there is an assumed a naturalness that the EU should complement US. So prevailing is this social practice that it is seen even to creep into the discourse of HR/VP, Federica Mogherini, shown in her concluding remarks at Parliamentary debate where she states that the EU cannot ‘go it alone’ because a solution cannot be found without American involvement.[119]

So not only is this social practice at direct odds with Borrell’s Strategy Discourse, which calls for an EU independent of the US, but it is also quite clearly much stronger, with some Member States prioritising the US position over the EU’s. What’s more, its strength is exacerbated by the need to secure unanimity in EU CFSP decision-making leaving competing discourses – like Borrell’s – out in the cold.

3. Internal Incoherence

In 2006 this social practice observed an assumed naturalness to side with either Israel or Palestine amongst EU Member States preventing a coherent response. Divergence within EU policy-making on Israel-Palestine is certainly true in the contemporary context. The accession of central European states, Romania (2007) and Croatia (2013), suggests this may have increased as they bring with them a h ost of representative officials prepared to buttress the Visegrad State’s positions.[120]

Following President Trump’s announcement, central European Member States, including Romania and Croatia, persistently broke ranks with official EU positions thereby deepening an assumed naturalness to side with Israeli allies. When asked why a spokesman for Czech president drew upon historic ties between the countries:

Israel and the US are key allies for the Czech Republic. Seventy years ago, Czechoslovakia helped Israel in its struggle for independence and 100 years ago, the US helped Czechoslovakia emerge.[121]

This reflects the same working culture observed by Patrick Child in 2006.[122] Despite the US’ move being at clear odds with the EU’s position, central European Member States still feel a naturalised tendency to side with Israel and American allies.

4. Obedient Civil Servants

The final social pract ise observed from 2006 was a discourse of obedience for civil servants and MEP’s which, despite their expertise, prevented them from having influence to change their social structure. The evidence collected from my research suggests this is still true today, although more would be needed to assess whether this has increased or decreased. On their perception of the Commission’s relative strength, a former MEP relayed an anecdote:

“In my very last week in the parliament organized an event – ‘The Legal Challenges of EU Trade with Occupied Territories.’ We really wanted somebody from the Commission to come to the Parliament, but they wouldn’t send anybody.”[123]

When asked why the Commission didn’t send anyone, they said:

“Well, they’re just scared I think. There’s a real fear, because, whatever the Commission says about foreign policy, then there’s also the complication of how that plays out within the relations to Israel and Palestine and Israel’s seen as a very str ong force to be reckoned with.”[124]

It was observed in 2006 that bureaucrats, such as the HR/VP, are pressured by fears of being politically marginalised to conform to the discourse of the day.[125] Evidence to show this is still true today suggests it will constrain the ability for Borrell to enact his own Strategy Discourse as repetition of social practices further engrains them into the social structure they constitute.[126]

Conclusion

This chapter has measured changes in the nature of discursive social practices over time. It found a shift in ambition of discursive practice (1) towards a more autonomous, coherent and powerful EU. But simultaneously an increase in prevalence and intensity of social practices (2) and (3) and a deepening of practice (4) through continuity/ repetition. I will now move on to interpret these findings by placing them back into the CDA framework I set out in Chapter Two.

CHAPTER FIVE

Interpreting Change in Social & Discursive Practice and Assessing Prospects for Success.

Introduction

This chapter is focused upon interpreting findings from Chapters Three and Four in order to assess what Borrell’s prospects are for success in overturning EU paralysis on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, thus answering SQ.3 and my overall RQ.2 therein. It does this by locating the findings back into the CDA framework set out in Chapter Two whilst appreciating the limitations of this research as well as its significance.

What are Borrell’s Prospects?

This study first sought to understand: how we can assess the prospects for success of Borrell’s radical shift in discourse to a “language of power”?

‘Success’ was defined as a change in the CFSP social structure to the effect of solving EU weak actorness towards the Is raeli-Palestinian conflict while the ‘HR/VP’s discourse’ was regarded as one practice in a negotiated order of social practices.[127]Hence, I said that to assess what Borrell’s prospects are, I must measure the trajectory of the other social practices that negotiate the order of discourse in the CFSP domain.

To measure trajectory, I first Identified what those practi ces have been – a Strategic Discourse of the HR(/VP) (1), competing with; pressure from the external audience (2); an internal incoherence (3); and a naturalised obedience of civil servants (4). Chapter Three concluded that, in 2006: there was no constitutive relationship between the Strategic Discourse (1) and social practices (2), (3) and (4); that Strategic Discourse (1) was weak in the face of the competing practices; and finally, that the relative strength of those social practices served to exacerbate characteristics of EU weak actorness.[19659011]In Chapter Four, I investigated how these practices have changed over time and found a radical shift in the Strategic Discourse of the HR/VP to one that addresses EU weak actorness towards Israel-Palestine, but only in rhetoric. For the HR/VP’s Strategic Discourse to be successful, then, we must observe a reduction in the relative strength of competing social practices (2), (3) and (4) that serve to exacerbate EU weak actorness characteristics. However, this chapter found no such reduction but instead an increase in intensity and prevalence of all three competing social practices. Increase and repetition of social practices can, as Charrett argues, ritualise them.[128] Compulsively repeated and very hard to break, rituals make incredibly strong components of the social structure. It can therefore be concluded that Borrell’s prospects for success at changing the EU’s social structure are low, even lower perhaps than if he had been HR(/VP) 14 years ago.

Limitations of Research

I must stress however, the data provided in Chapter Four is very limited. Whereas in Chapter Three data was drawn from 19 existing elite interviews from 2006,[129] these weren’t’ available in the context of 2017/18. They were supplemented with interviews from EU commentators, but lacked consistencies in number, scope, focus and the position held by interviewees.

  • Therefore, in addition to the two elite interviews conducted by myself, I would recommend that 17 more interviews be conducted with participants from EU institutions.

Although these limitations do not affect the answer to RQ.1 – a ‘how’ question – they do affect my ability to make concrete conclusions to RQ.2 – what Borrell’s prospects are. Nevertheless, it is my hope that the model presented in this research project can be applied to further research on this topic or indeed other research questions. For example: ‘What were the social practices present during the EU’s response to the annexation of Crimea 2014?’ Or ‘how do the social practices change in instances of successful EU collective action?’

Also, as Phillips and Jorgensen point out, the research is limited by my own reflexivity. Not only is the knowledge produced here just one representation of the world, but is also part of its own discursive struggle within the research field.[130] This is especially true when seeking to explain the EU in International Relations which requires a methodological pluralism.[131]

  • Therefore, I recommend that the findings from my sole use of constructivist CDA as a method be read in relation to, or contrasted by, other established IR concepts such as balance of power, multilateralism, multipolarity and globalisation.[132] For comprehensive understanding of EU foreign policy one needs to combine the EU’s internal character (as I have done) wi th an analysis of the international situation.[133]

Research Significance

As a critical theory and method, we can judge the political significance of my CDA led research in terms of the role the it plays in maintenance of, or challenge to, power relations in society.[134] With that view, in revealing the social discursive practices, my research has challenged both the power US and Israeli representatives hold over EU officials and the socio-political order between EU institutions. It has also implied that to foster more impactful and creative policy-making on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict one must first denaturalising the prevailing social practices that foreclose engaging with alternatives to the status quo. Hence, this research is for Commission and/or EEAS policy-makers, or indeed any person, working to that end. In practice this could take the form of recommendations such as:

  • placing limits on lobbyists present in EU insti tutions working to promote EU-Israeli relationships.
  • exploring new formats for European decision-making that circumvent the need for Member State consensus, for instance contact groups of willing member-states or strengthening the EU’s policy of ‘differentiation’.[135]
  • increasing airtime of the HR/VP at EU Council sittings.

Conclusion

This dissertation first sought to build a new framework – informed by CDA – through which we can study the EU in IR, plugging a much needed gap in the literature on discourse analysis in EU foreign policy studies.[136] Indeed, by employing CDA, I was able to shed light on internal dynamics of EU foreign policy-making where other scholars had not.[137] For example, we see an EU Commission constrained from exerting its full competencies[138] for fear of upsetting EU socio-political order. We also see perhaps a more recent change in the nature of the EU’s IR activ ities towards less transparency, where the US is ostensibly withdrawing from the world stage yet behind the scenes increasing its backdoor diplomatic efforts to ensure an acquiescent EU in relation to Israel-Palestine.

Hence, this dissertation sought to understand the role that discourses and social forces play in cultivating, or indeed thwarting, solutions towards one of the EU’s most long-standing foreign policy commitments – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It investigated the likelihood that one foreign policy tool had in overturning the CFSP’s failure of paralysis on its commitment, and judged it to be low in the face of commanding social forces that dictate EU policy behind the scenes – the more things change, the more they stay the same. However, by revealing previously unexamined assumptions that guide traditional modes of thought, we become better placed to break with precisely those things which have held the EU back. So, if Joseph Borrell wants to change the way the EU acts, he must interrogate the way it thinks, its common senses, its familiarities, its historic ties; he must understand how things stay the same, in order to make a difference.

End Notes

[1] EEAS, ‘Middle East Peace Process’, EEAS15/06/2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/middle-east-peace-process/337/middle-east-peace-process_en, [accessed 29 February 2020]

[2] See for example: Costanza Musu, European Union Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process : The Quicksands of Politics(ProQuest, Palgrave Macmillan Limited, 2010), pp. 1-22. Catherine Charrett, The EU, Hamas and the 2006 Palestinian Elections: A Performance in Politics, (London, Routledge, 2019), pp. 1-18. Dimitris Bouris, ‘Unintended Consequences of State-building Projects in Contested States: The EU in Palestine,’ The International Spectator54: 1, (2019), 89-104, (pp. 89-104). Alaa Tartir, ‘Securitizing Peace: The EU’s Aiding and Abetting Authoritarianism,’ in Palestine and Rule of Power. Middle East Todayed. by Alaa Tartir and T. Seidel (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2019) (pp. 227-247).

[3] European Parliament multimedia centre, ‘Hearing of Josep Borrell Fontelles, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy/Vice-President-designate of the European Commission,’ European Parliament, 07/10/2019, https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/hearing-of-josep-borrell-fontelles-high-representative-of-union-for-foreign-policy-and-security-poli_13228_pk?p_p_state=pop_up [accessed 25 October 19].

[4] Ibid.

[5] Louise Phillips and Marianne Jorgensn, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, (London, Sage, 2002), 121

[6] Norman Fairclough, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis as a method in social scienti fic research,’ in Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, ed. by Ruth Wodak and Micheal Meyer, (London, SAGE Publications, 2001), p.123

[7] Louise Phillips and Marianne Jorgensn, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, p.143

[8] European Parliament multimedia centre, ‘Hearing of Josep Borrell Fontelles, [accessed 25 October 19].

[9] Henrik Larsen,‘Discourse analysis in the study of European foreign policy’in Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy, ed. by Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2018). P.75

[10] Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,’ International OrganizationVol. 46, No. 2 (1992), p.397

[11] Karen Fierke, ‘Constructivism,’ in International relations theories: Discipline and diversityed. by Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith, 4thedn, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), p.168

[12] Ibid., p.168

[13] Wendt, Alexander. ‘Constructing International Politics,’ International Security 20, no. 1 (1995), pp. 71-81.

[14] Ibid., p.72

[15] Fairclough, 2001 referenced in Louise Phillips and Marianne Jorgensen, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Methodp.61

[16] Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,’ p.394

[17] Norman Fairclough, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis as a method in social scientific research,’ pp. 121-138.

[18] Louise Phillips and Marianne Jorgensn, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Methodp.143

[19] Ibid., p.143

[20] Norman Fairclough, ‘Critical Discourse Anal ysis as a method in social scientific research,’ p.124

[21] Interview with former member of the Palestinian Authority cited in Catherine Charrett, ‘Ritualised securitisation: The European Union’s failed response to Hamas’s success,’ p.164

[22] Interview with Christopher Patten, former EU Commissioner for External Relations cited in Ibid., p.169

[23] Ibid., pp. 156-178.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Louise Phillips and Marianne Jorgensn, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, p.64

[26] Christopher Hill, Michael Smith and Sophie Vanhoonacker, International Relations and the European Union, The New European Union Series, Edition 3, (Oxford,Oxford University Press, 2017), p.3

[27] Ibid., p.9

[28] Ibid., p.11

[29] For influential work relevant to this study see: Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 40.2, (2002), 235-258, (pp.235-258); Michael. E. Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalisation of Cooperation, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003); M.E. Smith, ‘Towards a Theory of EU Foreign Policy-making: Multilevel-Governance, Domestic Politics and National Adaption to Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, 11.4, (2004), pp.740-758; Michael. E. Smith, ‘The European External Action Service and the security-Development Nexus: organisations for effectiveness or incoherence?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 20.9, (2013), pp.1299-1315; Paul Pierson, ‘The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis,’ Comparative Political Studies, 29.2 (1996), 123-63

[30] Henrik Larsen,Theorising the European Union’s foreign policy,’ Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2018), p.62

[31] Smith, 1996 cited in Henrik Larsen,Theorising the European Union’s foreign policy,’ p.63

[32] Ibid., p.67

[33] Risse (1998), cited in Ibid., p.19

[34] Ibid., p.18

[35] Ibid., p.18

[36] Norman Fairclough, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis as a method in social scientific research,’ p.123

[37] Louise Phillips and Marianne Jorgensn, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, p.143

[38] Anders Persson, ‘How, When and Why Did the Way the EU Speaks About the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Change?’, [1 9459007]Middle East Critique27:4, (2018), 335-349, (p.335).

[39] EEAS, ‘Middle East Peace Process’, EEAS15/06/2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/middle-east-peace-process/337/middle-east-peace-process_en, [accessed 29 February 2020]

[40] Interview with Chris Davies, Former Member of European Parliament, Delegation to Palestinian Legislative Council, 2020

[41] Henrik Larsen,‘Discourse analysis in the study of European foreign policy’, P.75

[42] Ibid., p.62

[43] Norman Fairclough, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis as a method in social scientific research,’ (pp. 121-138).

[44] Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, cited in, Henrik Larsen,Theorising the European Union’s foreign policy,’ p.79

[45] Christopher Hill, Michael Smith and Sophie Vanhoonacker, International Relati ons and the European Union, p.8

[46] Norman Fairclough, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis as a method in social scientific research,’ p.126

[47] The role of HR/VP was created in 2007 with the Lisbon Treaty, before then the equivalent position was known as the High Representative for CFSP and was considerably more limited in scope. Source: Christopher Hill, Michael Smith and Sophie Vanhoonacker, International Relations and the European Union, p.34.

[48] Council of the EU, European Security Strategy – A secure Europe in a better world, (Brussels, European Union, 2003), pp.1-43, < https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf>

[49] Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 40.2, (2002), 235-258, (pp.235-258)

[50] Henrik Larsen,Theorising the European Union’s foreign policy,’ p.74[1 9659011][51] Council of the EU, European Security Strategy – A secure Europe in a better world, (Brussels, European Union, 2003), pp.1-43, < https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf>

[52] Jolyon Howorth, ‘The European Union’s Security and Defence Policy: The Quest for Purpose’, in Christopher Hill, et all., International Relations and the European Union, p.342

[53] Council of the EU, European Security Strategy – A secure Europe in a better world, (Brussels, European Union, 2003 ), p.36, < https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf>[accessed 28 March 2020].

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?’ pp.235-258

[57] Ibid., p. 240

[58] Ibid., p. 240

[59] Council of the EU, European Security Strategy – A secure Europe in a better world, (Brussels, European Unio n, 2003), p.8, < https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf>[accessed 28 March 2020].

[60] Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique’, Journal of European Public Policy, (2006), 13:2, 217-234, DOI: 10.1080/13501760500451634, p.217

[61] Duchên 1972, Hill 1990, Manners 2002 cited in Michael E. Smith (2011) A liberal grand strategy in a realist world? Power, purpose and the EU’s changing global role, Journal of European Public Policy, 18:2, p.149, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2011.544487

[62] European Union Election Observation Mission, Final Report EOM West Bank and Gaza 2006, (Brussels, European External Action Service, 2017), pp.1-39, < https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/palestinian-final-report-legislative-and-council.pdf> [accessed 17 March 2020].

[63] Ibid., p.1

[64] Patrick Mueller, Europe’s Foreign Policy and the Middle East Peace Process: The Construction of EU Actorness in Conflict Resolution, Perspectives on European Politics and Society(2013) 14: 1, 20-35, p.23

[65] Henrik Larsen,Theorising the European Union’s foreign policy,’ p.74

[66] Ibid., p.74

[67] Catherine Charrett, ‘Ritualised securitisation: The European Union’s failed response to Hamas’s success,’ pp. 156-178.

[68] Interview with Chris Davies, Former Member of European Parliament, Delegation to Palestinian Legislative Council, 2020

[69] Catherine Charrett, ‘Ritualised securitisation: The European Union’s failed response to Hamas’s success,’ pp. 156-178.

[70] Louise Phillips and Marianne Jorgensn, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Methodp.145

[71] European Union Election Observation Mission, Final Report EOM West Bank and Gaza 2006, (Brussels, European External Action Service, 2017), p. 1 < https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/palestinian-final-report-legislative-and-council.pdf> [accessed 17 March 2020].

[72] UNESCO, ‘Middle East Quartet’, UNESCO, 2020, [accessed 28 March 2020].

[73] Benita Ferrero-Waldner, ‘Speech: Suspen sion of aid to the Palestinian Authority government,’ European Commission, 2006, < https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_06_260>[accessed 13/03/2020]

[74] Interview with Chris Davies, Former Member of European Parliament, Delegation to Palestinian Legislative Council, 2020

[75] Turner, 2006 cited in Catherine Charrett, ‘Ritualised securitisation: The European Union’s failed response to Hamas’s success,’ p.168

[76] Interview with Anonymous, European External Action Service, Middle East Desk cited in Catherine Charrett, ‘Ritualised securitisation: The European Union’s failed response to Hamas’s success,’ p.168

[77] Interview with Christopher Patten, former EU Commissioner for External Relations cited in Catherine Charrett, ‘Ritualised securitisation: The European Union’s failed response to Hamas’s success,’ p.169

[78] Anders Persson ‘How, Whe n and Why Did the Way the EU Speaks About the Isra eli-Palestinian Conflict Change?’, pp. 335-349

[79]Ibid.,p.346

[80] Catherine Charrett, ‘Ritualised securitisation: The European Union’s failed response to Hamas’s success,’ p.166.

[81] Interview with Patrick Child, former head of cabinet for Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Chief Commissioner for EU External Relations cited in Ibid., p.166.

[82] Interview with Chris Davies, Former Member of European Parliament, Delegation to Palestinian Legislative Council, 2020

[83] Christopher Hill, Michael Smith and Sophie Vanhoonacker, International Relations and the European Union, p.357

[84] Interview with Chris Davies, Former Member of European Parliament, Delegation to Palestinian Legislative Council, 2020

[85] Catherine Charrett, ‘Ritualised securitisation: The European Union’s failed response to Hamas’s succe ss,’ p.167.

[86] European Parliament, ‘Palestinian elections: MEPs hail success of democratic process but urge Hamas to take path of peace. 27 January’, European Parliament, (2006), [accessed 4 December 2019].

[87] Interview with Chris Davies, Former Member of European Parliament, Delegation to Palestinian Legislative Council, 2020

[88] Ibid.

[89] Interview with Guardans Cambo, former colleague of HR Javier Solana, cited in Catherine Charrett, ‘Ritualised securitisation: The European Union’s failed response to Hamas’s success,’ p.158

[90] Catherine Charrett, ‘Ritualised securitisation: The European Union’s failed response to Hamas’s success,’ p.158

[91] Ibid., p.158

[92] European Parliament multimedia centre, ‘Hearing of Josep Borrell Fontelles’, [accessed 25 October 19].

[93] Council of the EU, European Secur ity Strategy – A secure Europe in a better world, (Brussels, European Union, 2003), pp.1-43, < https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf>

[94] Jolyon Howorth, ‘The European Union’s Security and Defence Policy: the Quest for Purpose,’ in International Relations and the European Union, p.360

[95] European Union, ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy’, (Brussels, European External Action Service, 2016) 1-60

[96] Jolyon Howorth, ‘The European Union’s Security and Defence Policy: the Quest for Purpose,’ in International Relations and the European Union, p.360

[97] European Union, ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe,’ p.32

[98] Jolyon Howorth, ‘The European Union’s Security and Defence Policy: the Quest for Purpose,’ International Relations and the European Union, p.360

[99] European Union, ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe,’ p.44

[100] European Parliament multimedia centre, ‘Hearing of Josep BORRELL FONTELLES,’ [accessed 25 October 19].

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

[103] For example: David Fernández, ‘Josep Borrell: A Realist European Foreign Policy?’, The New Federalist, 09/10/2019, https://www.thenewfederalist.eu/josep-borrell-a-realist-european-foreign-policy, [accessed 25 October 19].

[104] Henrik Larsen,Theorising the European Union’s foreign policy,’ p.74

[105] Risse (1998), cited in Ibid., p.19

[106] Louise Phillips and Marianne Jorgensn, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, p.145

[107] Hugh Lovatt, ‘EU backed into a corner on Israel-Palestine,’ European Council on Foreign Relations efcr.eu, 2017, < https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_eu_backed_into_a_corner_on_israel_palestine>[accessed 12/01/2020]

[108] Andrew Rettman, ‘EU gagged on ‘fundamental’ shift in Middle East,’ EUObserver, 2018, < https://euobserver.com/foreign/141805> [accessed 12 January 2020].

[109] @EUinIsrael, ‘Tweet by Official EU in Israel,’ Twitter, (2018), https://twitter.com/EUinIsrael/status/995031736764559361?s=20 , [accessed 12 January 2020].

[110] Interview with Former Member of European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Delegation for Relations with Palestine, Delegation for Relations with Israel, 2020

[111] Interview with Chris Davies, Former Member of European Parliament, Delegation to Palestinian Legislative Council, 2020

[112] Ibid.

[113] Interview with Former Member of European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Delegation for Relations with Palestine, Delegation for Relations with Israel, 2020

[114] Grégory Mauzé, ‘Israeli Networks of Influence in Brussel s,’ OrientXXI, (2019), < https://orientxxi.info/magazine/israeli-networks-of-influence-in-brussels-behind-the-scenes,2886>[accessed 28 April 2020]

[115] Lobbyfacts.eu, ‘European Coalition for Israel (ECI),’ Lobbyfacts.eu, 2020, < https://lobbyfacts.eu/representative/00c97852e75940178656b39db075d1c0/european-coalition-for-israel> [accessed 3 March 2020]

[116] Marianne Riddervold and Akasemi Newsome, ‘Transatlantic relations in times of uncertainty: crises and EU-US relations,’ Journal of European Integration, 40:5, (2018), 505-521, p.505.

[117] Interview with Anonymous cited in Barak Ravid, ‘EU statement opposing U.S. embassy move is blocked,’ AXIOS, 2018, [accessed 12 January 2020].

[118] Catherine Charrett, ‘Ritualised securitisation: The European Union’s failed response to Hamas’s success,’ p.171

[119] European Parliament, ‘US President Trump’s announcement to recognise Jerusalem as capital of Israel (Debate),’ European Parliament, (2017), < https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-8-2017-12-12-ITM-015_EN.html> [accessed 15 April 2020]   

[120] Patrick Mueller, ‘Europe’s Foreign Policy and the Midd le East Peace Process: The Construction of EU Actorness in Conflict Resolution’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society14: 1, (2013), pp. 20-35, p.28

[121] Andrew Rettman, ‘EU gagged on ‘fundamental’ shift in Middle East,’ < https://euobserver.com/foreign/141805> [accessed 12 January 2020].

[122] Catherine Charrett, ‘Ritualised securitisation: The European Union’s failed response to Hamas’s success,’ p.166.

[123] Interview with Former Member of European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Delegation for Relations with Palestine, Delegation for Relations with Israel, 2020

[124] Ibid.

[125] Catherine Charrett, ‘Ritualised securitisation: The European Union’s failed response to Hamas’s success,’ p.158

[126] Ibid., pp. 156-178.

[127] Louise Phillips and Marianne Jorgensn, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, (London, Sage, 2002), p.143

[128] Catherin e Charrett, ‘Ritualised securitisation: The European Union’s failed response to Hamas’s success,’ pp. 156-178.

[129] Ibid.

[130] Louise Phillips and Marianne Jorgensn, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, p.116

[131] Christopher Hill, Michael Smith and Sophie Vanhoonacker, International Relations and the European Union, p.8

[132] Ibid.

[133] Ibid.

[134] Louise Phillips and Marianne Jorgensn, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, p.116

[135] Anders Persson, ‘EU differentiation’ as a case of ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Journal of European Integration40:2, (2018), 193-208, pp.193-208.

[136] Henrik Larsen,‘Discourse analysis in the study of European foreign policy,’P.75

[137] Ibid., p.62[19659011][138] Christopher Hill, Michael Smith and Sophie Vanhoonacker, International Relations and the European Union, p.34.

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Written at: University of Sheffield
Written for: Benedict F Docherty
Date written: May 2020

Further Reading on E-International Relations

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